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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-4438
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SAM STALLINGS,
a/k/a Craig Gay
SAM STALLINGS,
Appellant
_____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00368-001)
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2013
____________
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 6, 2013)
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant Sam Stallings was convicted following trial of being a felon in

possession, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 96 months’
imprisonment. He appealed. The only issue before us on appeal is whether the District
Court correctly determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop
made of Stallings and, thus, that his motion to suppress was properly denied. We will
affirm.
I.
On the night of April 4, 2009, Philadelphia police officers Ivan Rosado and David
Marcellino were on patrol in a neighborhood in northwest Philadelphia. The
neighborhood is considered a high-crime area that has “a lot of gun crimes, a lot of
shootings, [and] a lot of robberies.” App. 41.
At approximately 8:15 p.m., a woman signaled the officers as they approached the
corner of 21st and Medarie Streets. When the officers stopped to speak with her, she told
them that there was an African-American man armed with a gun, sitting in a black
Cadillac with chrome rims around the corner. The officers immediately went to
investigate. As they rounded the corner onto Chelten Street, they saw a black Cadillac
with chrome rims parked directly facing them. As they drove past the Cadillac, the
officers noticed an African-American man, later identified as Stallings, reclining in the
driver’s seat and talking on his cell phone. When Stallings saw the officers, he lowered
his seat.
The officers doubled back, parked behind the Cadillac, and shone a light on it.
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They then approached the car, with Officer Rosado on the driver’s side and Officer
Marcellino on the passenger’s side. Officer Rosado knocked on the driver’s window:
Stallings looked at him, but otherwise did not respond and continued to hold his cell
phone in his left hand. His right hand, however, was obscured, and this concerned
Officer Rosado. Officer Rosado told Stallings to “open the door.” App. 30. Stallings
ignored the order. Still concerned that he could not see Stallings’ right hand, Officer
Rosado opened the driver’s side door and said to Stallings that “somebody just said you
have a gun. Is there any weapons in this car?” Id. Stallings asked “who called the cops
on me?” Id. Officer Rosado patted Stallings’ waist area while he sat in the car, and felt
no weapon, but because Stallings’ hands were shaking and he appeared “really nervous,”
he told Stallings to step out of the car so that he could be frisked. Id.
Meanwhile, Officer Marcellino approached the open driver’s door. Given the
position of the seat, the floor underneath the seat was visible, and when Officer
Marcellino shone his flashlight on the floor area he saw the handle of a gun--a 9mm
semi-automatic handgun. A subsequent search of the car uncovered a semi-automatic
rifle in the trunk.
Before trial, Stallings moved to suppress evidence of the two weapons found
during the search of his Cadillac, arguing that reasonable suspicion to conduct the Terry
stop did not exist because the anonymous tip that led to the stop was insufficiently
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reliable. 1 The District Court concluded that the totality of the circumstances, including
the reliable tip, high-crime environment, and Stallings’ suspicious actions, created
reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot.
II. 2
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). An established
exception to the general rule that searches without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable is a Terry stop, that is, “police can stop and briefly detain a person for
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable
facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968)). Moreover, an officer may then frisk a person “where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
However, if an officer conducts a Terry stop without the requisite reasonable suspicion,
any evidence recovered is “fruit of the poisonous tree” and must be suppressed. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); see United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d
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Stallings also argued that the officers unlawfully arrested him, conducted an illegal
search to recover the 9mm handgun, and seized the assault rifle incident to an illegal
arrest. He has not renewed these arguments on appeal, and they are waived.
2
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our jurisdiction
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear
error and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s application of the law to those
facts. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003).
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239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006).
We assess whether reasonable suspicion existed based on “the totality of the
circumstances” from the viewpoint of objectively reasonable law enforcement officers,
which involves dealing not “with hard certainties, but with probabilities.” United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). In this regard, while we afford deference to law
enforcement officers “draw[ing] on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information,” acting on “a
mere ‘hunch’” is insufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
In addition to evaluating law enforcement officers’ independent observations,
where the genesis of an investigation involves an anonymous tip, we “must scrutinize the
informant’s “‘veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.’” United States v. Johnson,
592 F.3d 442, 449 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990)).
“‘[A]n anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or
veracity,’ . . . however, there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably
corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to
make the investigatory stop.’” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (quoting White,
496 U.S. at 327, 329). The following factors are relevant to this inquiry:
(1) [whether] the information was provided to the police in a face-to-face
interaction, allowing an officer to assess directly the informant’s credibility;
(2) [whether] the informant can be held responsible if her allegations are
untrue;
(3) [whether] the information would not be available to the ordinary
5

observer;
(4) [whether] the informant has recently witnessed the criminal activity at
issue; and
(5) [whether] the witness’s information accurately predicts future activity.
Johnson, 592 F.3d at 449. However, “a tip need not bear all of the indicia—or even any
particular indicium—to supply reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d
207, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).
Parenthetically, our reasonable suspicion analysis, and that of the District Court
before us, includes only “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22; see also J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. The District Court found, and
we agree, that Officer Rosado effectuated the Terry stop when he opened the driver’s side
door—an action that would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he was not free to
leave—and Stallings submitted to this “show of authority.” Brown, 448 F.3d at 245 (“A
seizure occurs when there is either (a) ‘a laying on of hands or application of physical
force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful,’ or (b) submission to
‘a show of authority.’ (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)));
Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (determining that investigative
stop began when officer persisted in demanding that defendant roll down his car window
after defendant had refused the initial request).
Officers Rosado and Marcellino were patrolling a neighborhood with a reputation
for violent crime when a woman flagged them down to indicate that a man in a Cadillac
with chrome rims had a gun. The interaction occurred face-to-face and the officers had
6

the opportunity to assess the woman’s credibility and demeanor. See United States v.
Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he circumstances support the reliability
of the tip: [among other circumstances,] the officers could assess the informant’s
credibility as he spoke, knew what the informant looked like, and had some opportunity
to find the informant if the tip did not pan out.”).
Additionally, the information that the woman provided was immediately
corroborated by the officers’ independent observations as they drove around the corner,
that is, the type of car, its location, and the description of the driver. See United States v.
Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 272 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The police corroboration of the anonymous
tip’s innocent details, the cases teach, bolsters the veracity and reliability of the tip . . .
.”); United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the reliability
of an anonymous informant’s tip was enhanced by the officers’ ability to corroborate
details related to the vehicle). The District Court did not err in concluding that the tip
had sufficient indicia of reliability. 3
The circumstances at the time of the seizure also informed the reasonable
suspicion calculus. First, it was after dark when the woman approached the officers and
the area was described in uncontradicted testimony as one prone to gun violence. See
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[O]fficers are not required to ignore the
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We see no need to address United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000), and
United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2012), the very distinguishable cases on
which Stallings primarily relies.
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relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. . . . [T]he fact that the stop
occurred in a high crime area is among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry
analysis.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Brown, 448 F.3d at 251
(identifying the presence of a suspect in a high-crime area and the lateness of the hour as
factors suggesting suspicious behavior). Second, some of Stallings’ actions appeared
evasive. He reclined his seat as far back as possible, ignored Officer Rosado when he
knocked on the window, and continued to hold his cell phone in his left hand while his
right hand remained hidden from view. Officer Rosado had reason to be concerned for
his safety and for the safety of Officer Marcellino.
The District Court correctly concluded that, under the totality of the
circumstances, reasonable suspicion supported the Terry stop of Stallings, and the motion
to suppress was, therefore, properly denied.
III.
The judgment of sentence will be affirmed.
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